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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
HERCULES INCORPORATED, ] 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
AUDITING DIVISION, 
Respondent. 
i Appeal No. 93-0051 
i Priority No. 16 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1992) and Rule 49 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals was correct 
in finding several of the District Court's findings of fact 
clearly erroneous. 
Standard of Review: Findings of fact will not be 
set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See, Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a) (as amended, effective January 1, 1987); See also, 
Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 
(Utah 1989). 
Issue 2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals properly 
determined that sales of rocket motors manufactured and delivered 
in Utah to a Utah purchaser were Utah sales pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann- § 59-7-318 (1987). 
Standard of Review- Conclusions of law will be 
reviewed for correctness with no deference to the District 
Court's interpretations. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757 
(Utah 1990). See also State ex rel Div. of Consumer Protection 
v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990); Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
Issue 3. Whether the Tax Commission's including 
Hercules' Utah sales of rocket motors to an in-state purchaser in 
calculating Hercules' franchise tax liability violates the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 
Standard of Review. Conclusions of law will be 
reviewed for correctness with no deference to the District 
Court' s interpretations. Id. 


















. CONST., Art. I, § 8, CI. 3. 
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Code Ann. § 59-7-318 (1987). 
Code Ann. § 59-7-301 (1987). 
Code Ann. § 59-7-102(3) (1987). 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-106(l) (1990). 
Tax Commission Rule R865-6-8F(I)(4)(b) and 
(1989). 
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9. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This review on petition for certiorari is from a Utah 
Court of Appeals decision ("Opinion") (Attached as Appendix 1) 
overturning a decision rendered by the Third Judicial District 
Court. (R. 418.) The District Court had reversed the decision of 
the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission" or "Commission") 
and ruled that rocket motor sales made by Hercules to Lockheed 
were not Utah sales and therefore not properly included in the 
numerator of the Utah sales factor under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-
317 (1987) and § 59-7-318 (1987) [renumbering § 59-13-92 and § 
59-13-93]. (R. 432.) These sections of the Utah Code refer to 
the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act ("UDITPA") 
which sets forth the method for taxing income derived by a 
corporation both from within and without the state of Utah. 
Under the UDITPA, income is apportioned among taxing 
states based on three factors: payroll/ property, and sales. The 
sales factor is a fractionf "the numerator of which is the total 
sales of the taxpayer within this state during the tax period, 
and the denominator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer 
everywhere during the tax period." Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-317 
(1987). The business income to be apportioned to Utah is 
determined by "multiplying the income by a fraction, the 
3 
numerator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor 
plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-311. 
The issues in this case pertain only to the sales 
factor of the formula. The Tax Commission has determined that 
the Utah portion of the sales factor (the numerator of the sales 
ratio) should be increased to reflect Hercules Incorporated's 
("Hercules") in-state sales of rocket motors to Lockheed Space 
and Missile Company ("Lockheed"). Hercules' property and payroll 
factors are not affected by the Commission's determination. 
2. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In 1982, the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("Auditing Division") issued a Notice of Deficiency to 
Hercules asserting that Hercules owed additional Utah corporate 
franchise taxes for the years 1977 to 1980. (R. 720.) 
On October 28, 1982, Hercules filed a Petition for 
Redetermination with the Tax Commission. (R. 721.) On March 11, 
1983, Hercules filed a Supplement to Petition for Redetermination 
with the Tax Commission. (R. 728.) 
On July 15, 1986, the Tax Commission held an informal 
hearing on Hercules' Petition for Redetermination and on November 
12, 1986 the Tax Commission issued its Informal Decision 
affirming the deficiency assessed by the Auditing Division. (R. 
696, 701.) 
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On August 24, 1987, a formal hearing was held before 
the Tax Commission. (R. 1058.) The Tax Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision on 
October 4, 1988. (R. 622.) In its decision, the Tax Commission 
affirmed the audit deficiency in favor of the Auditing Division. 
(R. 29, 629.) 
On November 2, 1988, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
505 (1987), Hercules paid $890,462.00, which amount included tax 
and interest, to the Tax Commission as a prerequisite to taking 
its appeal to the District Court. Of that amount, $456,512.00 
was contested and paid under protest. (R. 13.) 
On January 31, 1989, Hercules filed with the District 
Court an Amended Appeal, Petition for Review and Complaint 
seeking review of the Tax Commission's ruling. (R. 63.) After 
oral argument, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision, 
dated February 1, 1991, and final Judgment, dated March 11, 1991, 
reversing the Tax Commission's ruling and ordering the Commission 
to refund, with interest, the taxes that Hercules paid under 
protest. (R. 418, 438.) The District Court held that Hercules' 
sales to Lockheed were not Utah sales pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-7-317 and § 59-7-318. (R. 432.) The District Court further 
held that the Auditing Division's taxation of Hercules 
constituted double taxation in violation of the Commerce Clause 
of the United States. (R. 432.) 
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The Commission timely appealed the District Court 
decision to this Court which transferred the case to the Court of 
Appeals- On December 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals' Opinion 
reversed the District Court in favor of the Auditing Division. 
On January 28, 1993, Hercules petitioned this Court for Writ of 
Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. On June 18, 1993, this 
Court granted Hercules' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the years 1977 to 1980, Hercules was obligated 
under a subcontract with Lockheed to manufacture rocket motors 
for the Trident C-4 missile. Lockheed was obligated under a 
prime contract with the U.S. Government to manufacture the 
Trident C-4 missile. In 1982, the Auditing Division issued a 
"Notice of Deficiency" to Hercules for additional Utah corporate 
franchise tax for calendar years 1977 through 1980. The 
deficiency was based on the Auditing Division's interpretation 
and application of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-7-317 and 59-7-318 (1987) 
to rocket motors manufactured by Hercules at its Bacchus, Utah 
facility. (R. 720.) 
The entire manufacturing process which produced the 
rocket motors took place at Hercules' facility in Bacchus, Utah. 
(R. 1119-23, 1146-47.) Lockheed was the prime contractor which 
was to provide completed missiles to the U.S. Government. 
Hercules was a subcontractor, which was to provide motor 
components to Lockheed. 
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When the manufacturing of the rocket motors was 
completed under the subcontract, Lockheed inspected the motors 
and received title to the motors at Bacchus, Utah, (R. 661.) 
The U.S. Government in turn took title to the motors in Utah 
before shipping the motors to the out of state facilities. The 
rocket motors were then shipped via common carrier, under a U.S. 
Government bill of lading, to a military seaport assembly 
facility. (R. 662.) The point of final acceptance by Lockheed 
and the United States was at Hercules' Bacchus, Utah facility. 
(R. 661.) 
Upon final acceptance and title transfer, the motors 
met all contract specifications required at that point. (R. 
662.) The subcontract items consisted of the unconnected first, 
second and third stage motors of the C-4 missile body, each 
containing an explosive propellant, in an inert form, to 
facilitate interstate transportation to a seaport assembly 
facility. (R. 675, 1145.) 
The Trident missile, the subject of the prime contract, 
was comprised of the motors and many other necessary component 
parts, some of which were supplied by Hercules and some of which 
were supplied by Lockheed, the United States, or third parties. 
(R. 659, 1088.) The missile assembly process was completed by 
the prime contractor, Lockheed, at the destination assembly 
facility. (R. 1120.) At the destination facility, Lockheed 
performed the hands-on manufacturing work, and Hercules provided 
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only advisory and technical assistance and inspection oversight 
to assure that specifications were met. (R. 1123, 1146, 1158.) 
The final step in the manufacturing and assembly 
process was performed by Lockheed at the seaport facilities. (R. 
1146.) At that point, the United States took possession of the 
assembled missile, attached the nuclear warhead or other cargo 
and placed the same in a canister for storage or loading into 
Navy submarines at the assembly site. (R. 1088, 1158.) 
Hercules was compensated by a cost-plus, fixed fee 
contract calling for partial payment upon delivery in Utah as 
well as additional payments for services performed at the 
destination facilities and future component performance. The 
contract provided for incentives to reward good performance as 
well as penalties to deter bad performance. The compensation 
which Hercules received was based upon costs incurred together 
with a portion of the profits based upon acceptance at the plant, 
with some of the future profits withheld contingent upon 
component performance. (R. 659.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court of Appeals was correct in finding several of 
the District Court's findings of fact clearly erroneous and 
totally without support in the record. In finding several of 
these findings clearly erroneous, the Court of Appeals correctly 
applied Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 and found that Hercules' 
delivery of rocket motors to Lockheed at Bacchus, Utah 
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constituted Utah sales and were appropriately included in the 
Utah sales factor under the UDITPA. 
The Court of Appeals' analysis and non-application of 
the destination rule was proper in this case. While the Tax 
Commission has accepted the validity of the destination rule, it 
is not applicable to the facts of this case. Whether the 
destination rule is a valid rule of law has never been contested 
by the Tax Commission. Neither the Tax Commission nor the Court 
of Appeals applied the destination rule in this case because the 
facts and clear language of § 59-7-318 simply do not warrant it. 
The Court of Appeals properly found that no interstate 
sale occurred and therefore, no double taxation issue in 
violation of the Commerce Clause is raised. Regardless of 
whether an interstate sale occurred, Utah's inclusion of a sale 
which occurred in Utah in the numerator of the sales factor does 
not violate the principles of the UDITPA or Commerce Clause of 
the United States Constitution. 
Under the controlling case of Complete Auto Transit, 
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), a taxing authority must 
satisfy four prongs in order to sustain a tax on interstate 
commerce. The four prongs are as follows: 
(1) The tax must be applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing state; 
(2) The tax must be fairly apportioned; 
9 
(3) The tax must not discriminate against interstate 
commerce; and 
(4) The tax must be fairly related to the services 
provided by the state. 
Id. at 279. 
Because the Tax Commission has satisfied these four 
prongs in taxing Hercules' sales to Lockheed in Utah, the tax is 
not violative of the Commerce Clause and should be upheld. The 
facts of this case show that the rocket motors sold by Hercules 
to Lockheed constitute Utah sales, not California or Washington 
sales. 
There is no evidence in the record as to exactly what 
transpired between Hercules and the California and Washington 
taxing authorities. The fact that Hercules paid tax in some 
other jurisdiction is irrelevant regardless of whether it was 
paid mistakenly, voluntarily, or involuntarily. Utah cannot be 
bound by the decisions of other states. The sales at issue in 
this case were clearly Utah sales and are therefore properly 
included in the numerator of the Utah sales factor under the 
UDITPA. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FACTS SHOW, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS 
CORRECTLY FOUND, THAT THE SALES OF THE 
MISSILE MOTORS WERE UTAH SALES. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 (1987) dictates when a sale 
occurs in Utah for franchise tax purposes: 
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(1) Sales of tangible personal property are 
in this state if: 
(a) the property is delivered or 
shipped to a purchaser, other than 
the United States Government, 
within this state, regardless of 
the f.o.b. point or other 
conditions of the sale. 
The Utah Administrative Code further defines the 
meaning of the language in Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 (1987), 
"delivered or shipped to a purchaser . . . within this state." 
(b) Property shall be deemed to be delivered 
or shipped to a purchaser within this state 
if the recipient is located in this state 
even though the property is ordered from 
outside the state. 
(c) Property is delivered or shipped to a 
purchaser within this state if the shipment 
terminates in this state, even though the 
property is subsequently transferred by the 
purchaser to another state. 
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-6-8F(I)(4)(b), (c) (emphasis added). 
The facts were stipulated that Lockheed was located within the 
State of Utah an had a business presence here at the time it 
purchased the rocket motors from Hercules. And, while the rocket 
motors were eventually shipped out of Utah by the U.S. 
Government, they were nevertheless delivered to Lockheed, a Utah 
purchaser, in Bacchus, Utah. Therefore, under the clear language 
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 and Utah Code Admin. P. R865-6-8F, 
the sales were Utah sales under the UDITPA. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-106(l) (1990) states that "[a] 
'sale' consists of the passing of title from the seller to the 
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buyer for a price . . . ." The parties have stipulated that 
title to the rocket motors passes in Bacchus, Utah, (R. 19.) 
The contract between Hercules and Lockheed states that 
"acceptance shall constitute delivery for satisfying the delivery 
schedules set forth herein and provide substantiation for billing 
purposes, and acknowledges that title to the subcontractor end 
items vests in LMSC [Lockheed Missiles and Space Company]." (R. 
661.) Clearly, if Lockheed is being billed by Hercules under the 
contract for the motors, Lockheed is paying a price for the 
rocket motors. Therefore, both requirements of § 70A-2-106(l) 
constituting a sale are met by the transaction between Hercules 
and Lockheed in Bacchus, Utah. 
The Court of Appeals found that "[t]he [District] 
[C]ourt erred when it found the subject matter of the Hercules 
sale to Lockheed was a functional or usable motor that could be 
fired." Opinion at 4. The Court of Appeals found further that 
"[t]he manufacturing of the missile motor was complete at 
Hercules' Bacchus facility." Opinion at 4. These findings are 
fully supported by the record and the District Court's findings 
to the contrary are clearly erroneous and without support in the 
record. 
Hercules argues that "when the motors left Utah, they 
were inert, dysfunctional and lacked critical interface and 
ignition components" and therefore the manufacture of the missile 
motors was not complete when Lockheed accepted delivery at 
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Hercules' Bacchus facility. Brief of Petitioner at 37-40. That 
argument is illogical and without merit given the simple facts of 
this case. The contract between Hercules and Lockheed calls for 
the sale of rocket motors - not the sale of completed missiles. 
It is irrelevant that the motors are "inert" and are inoperable 
until integrated into the missile. 
The point is that Hercules was only responsible for the 
motor under the subcontract. The propulsion systems for Lockheed 
contracted which were complete when they were accepted by 
Lockheed in Bacchusf Utah. However, the systems would not fire 
until after Lockheed installed the additional initiation/ 
ignition, and activation devices at Lockheed's seaport facility. 
(R. 1123, lines 3-12; R. 1146, lines 9-11.) Hercules was 
responsible only for the motors. The record is clear that the 
additional material needed to convert the completed motors into a 
total missile was installed entirely by Lockheed employees at its 
seaport facility. (R. 1119, line 23 - R. 1120, line 4.; R. 1146, 
lines 9-14.) Therefore, when Hercules delivers the completed 
motors and title to those motors is transferred to Lockheed at 
the Bacchus, Utah facility, a Utah delivery and sale occur for 
taxation purposes. 
The Court of Appeals properly concluded that "[t]he 
tangible personal property contracted for by Hercules and 
Lockheed, and the subject matter of the sale generating the 
business income to be apportioned, was the missile motor as it 
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left Hercules' Bacchus facility.*' Opinion at 4-5. The Court of 
Appeals continued by concluding that "[a]pplying section 59-13-93 
[renumbered in 1987 as § 59-7-318] to the motor as it left 
Hercules' Bacchus facility leads to only one reasonable 
conclusion: the sale of the missile motor was a Utah sale," 
Opinion at 5. The facts surrounding the sale of the rocket 
motors by Hercules to Lockheed at Bacchus, Utah fit squarely 
within the definitions of sale explicitly defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 59-7-318 (1987) and 70A-2-106(l) (1990). As Utah sales, 
the sales of the rocket motors by Hercules are properly included 
in the Utah sales factor under the UDITPA. 
A. Hercules' arguing in favor of 
application of the destination rule in 
this case is misleading. 
Hercules claims that the Court of Appeals' analysis of 
the cases Hercules cites in support of application of the 
destination rule is "superficial and demonstrably incorrect." 
Brief of Petitioner at 21. In support of its erroneous claim, 
Hercules notes that "[n]one of the cited cases suggests the beer, 
carpet, banana and petroleum companies could not also have had 
presence in the origin or manufacturing state as well as the 
destination state." Brief of Petitioner at 21. Again, this 
argument is irrelevant and only serves to confuse the pivotal 
issue of this case; that is, "where did the sale of the rocket 
motors occur?" 
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First, as discussed above, the facts surrounding the 
sale of the rocket motors to Lockheed in Bacchus, Utah fall 
clearly within Utah's UDITPA statute and commercial code. The 
plain language of § 59-7-318 mandates the inclusion of Hercules' 
rocket motor sales which take place in Utah in the sales factor. 
That is precisely why neither the Tax Commission nor the Court of 
Appeals found the destination rule applicable in this case. 
Second, the cases cited by Hercules which apply the 
destination rule are factually distinguishable from this case. 
Hercules attempts to revive its destination rule argument in the 
face of the Court of Appeals' flat refusal to apply it by arguing 
what "could have been" or "might have been" the facts of the 
cases Hercules cites. "The beer, carpet, banana and petroleum 
companies in the cases Hercules cited either had or could have 
had 'presence' in the state seeking to impose the tax just as 
Lockheed had 'presence in Utah.'" Brief of Petitioner at 24. 
However, each of the courts rendering the opinions on which 
Hercules relies make clear that the purchasers in those cases did 
not have presence in the taxing state. Hercules' speculation to 
the contrary is misleading and should be given absolutely no 
weight by this Court. 
In Olvmpia Brewing Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 326 
N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1982) the Minnesota Supreme Court clearly 
adopts the destination rule. However, the facts of the case, as 
stated by the Minnesota Court were that only out-of-state 
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purchasers were involved. "In computing the sales-within-
Minnesota factor, Olympia excluded all beer sold by its St. Paul 
brewery to out-of-state wholesale distributors and included all 
beer sold . . . to Minnesota wholesale distributors." Olympia 
Brewing Co.. 326 N.W.2d at 644 (emphasis added). The facts are 
clear that the only issue involved whether or not to include the 
sales made to out-of-state distributors because the beer sold to 
Minnesota distributors had already been included by the taxpayer 
in computing its sales factor. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
continued and stated that "Olympia is not suggesting that the 
location of the final consumer, after resale upon resale, be 
determinative of the sales classification. The inquiry ends when 
it is determined where the initial purchaser is located; it is 
there that shipment and delivery terminate." Ld. at 647 
(emphasis added). 
In this case, the parties stipulated that Lockheed was 
a purchaser located in Utah. (R. 19.) Under the reasoning of 
Olympia Brewing, the inquiry ends there because Lockheed was the 
initial purchaser of the rocket motors from Hercules. One need 
not apply the destination rule once it is determined that the 
purchaser (Lockheed) is located in Utah. The stipulation that 
Lockheed is an in-state purchaser should end the inquiry. The 
destination rule need not be applied because no out-of-state 
purchaser is involved in the Utah sale. 
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Likewise, in Strickland v. Patcraft Mills, Inc., 302 
S.E.2d 544 (Ga. 1983), applying the destination rule, the Georgia 
Supreme Court stated that "[i]n all the transactions under 
review, Patcraft, a Georgia corporation, allowed out-of-state 
customers to pick up merchandise at its Dalton headquarters for 
transport and resale out of state." Strickland, 302 S.E.2d at 
544 (emphasis added). 
In Pabst Brewing Co. v. Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, 387 N.W.2d 121 (Wis.Ct.App. 1986), the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals also recognized the destination rule. However, it too 
concluded that the "purchaser's business location controls." 
Pabst Brewing, 387 N.W.2d at 123. "We conclude that because the 
location of the purchasing wholesaler rather than the pick up 
controls whether the sales are in this state . . . . .Id. at 123. 
The Pabst Brewing Court explicitly states in the fact section of 
its opinion that "[t]he issue is whether Pabst's sales of beer to 
out-of-state wholesalers who pick up the beer at its Milwaukee 
plant for out-of-state distribution are sales 'in this state' 
under [the UDITPA]." Pabst Brewing, 387 N.W.2d at 122 (emphasis 
added). The facts in Pabst Brewing make clear that the Wisconsin 
Court was only considering tax on sales made to out-of-state 
purchasers. If these purchasers "had" or "could have had" 
presence in Wisconsin, it would be unusual that the court would 
explicitly state that they were out-of-state purchasers. 
Hercules' argument misstates the facts of the cases. 
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In Texaco v. Groppo, 574 A.2d 1293 (Conn. 1990), the 
Connecticut Supreme Court also noted that "the plaintiff supplied 
petroleum products to five distributors whose businesses and 
customers were located entirely outside the state." Texaco, 574 
A.2d at 1294 (emphasis added). If the distributors' businesses 
and customers were located entirely outside the state, it seems 
irrational to assume that they "had" or "could have had" presence 
within Connecticut. Hercules' arguing that they "could have" 
ignores the clear language of the decision. 
In Department of Revenue v. Parker Banana Co., 391 
So.2d 762 (Fla.Ct.App. 1980), the Florida Court of Appeals also 
clearly adopts the destination rule. However, the Florida Court 
of Appeals stated that the issue in the case arose because "[i]n 
computing its Florida corporate income tax, Parker Banana treated 
all sales to purchasers from outside Florida as sales not in the 
state." Parker Banana, 391 So.2d at 762 (emphasis added). The 
Florida Department of Revenue "took the position that only those 
sales to out-of-state purchasers who used common carriers to pick 
up their bananas could properly be characterized as sales not in 
this state for purposes of the apportionment formula." Parker 
Banana, 391 So.2d at 763. The facts of Parker Banana as stated 
by the Florida Court of Appeals reveal that the only transactions 
at issue were those involving out-of-state purchasers. 
Therefore, contrary to Hercules' assertions, none of the 
purchasers had presence within the state. 
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In Howmet Corporation v. Revenue Division of the 
Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 1993 WL 45075 (Mich.Ct.CI. 1993), the 
Michigan Court of Claims addressed the issue of whether a 
privilege tax levied on out-of-state sales against an in-state 
manufacturer violated the UDITPA or the Commerce Clause. The 
Michigan court concluded that the in-state manufacturer had 
sufficient nexus with the destination states to allow imposition 
of privilege tax by those destination states. Again, the facts 
of the instant case as found by the Court of Appeals are 
distinguishable. The sale of the rocket motors occurred in Utah, 
not in Washington or California. In Howmet, it is undisputed 
that the sales occurred in the destination states. Furthermore, 
the relevant statutory standard in Michigan is different than 
Utah's. In Michigan, the UDITPA statute states that "sales of 
tangible personal property to purchasers in other states are to 
be treated as 'in this state' where . . . [t]he property is 
shipped from a • . . place of storage in this state and the 
purchaser is the United States government, or the taxpayer is not 
taxable in the state of the purchaser." Howmet, 1993 WL 45075 at 
*2. Therefore, the Michigan court's inquiry focused on whether 
the taxpayer was properly "taxable in the statefs] of the 
purchaserfs]." The Michigan court found that the taxpayer was 
properly taxable in the states of the purchasers. However, it 
did not reach this conclusion through application of the 
destination rule as Hercules leads this Court to believe. The 
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Michigan court reached its conclusion by applying standards 
outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine the nexus between 
the "destination states" and the taxpayer. It is significant to 
note that the Michigan court applied the four-pronged Complete 
Auto test to the Michigan tax to determine its constitutionality 
as discussed in section II of this brief. 
The manufacture of the missile motors was completed and 
delivered to an in-state purchaser (Lockheed) in Utah, not in 
Washington or California. Other than Hercules occasionally 
"signing off" at certain points at the port facilities, the only 
transactions which took place in Washington and California were 
between Lockheed and the U.S. Government. (R. 1092-94, 1119-20, 
1123, 1146-47.) Therefore, the Court of Appeals properly found 
that the sale of the rocket motors was a Utah sale under the 
UDITPA. None of Hercules' "authorities" supports application of 
the destination rule in this case because in all those cases, the 
facts are clear that none of the purchasers were in-state 
purchasers. All were out-of-state purchasers which came into the 
taxing state to take delivery from an in-state seller. 
Hercules attempts to distinguish Bullock v. Ensearch 
Exploration, Inc., 614 S.W.2d 215 (Tex.Civ.App. 1981), by 
pointing out that the sales in Bullock involved natural gas which 
was commingled in a single tank prior to shipment out of state. 
"The gas seller could not foresee the ultimate destination of the 
fungible goods injected into a pipeline." Brief of Petitioner at 
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27, n. 4. This is an interesting distinction because in Texaco, 
which Hercules cites in support of its argument, title to 
petroleum products passed in Connecticut which were taken from 
Texaco's terminals by out-of-state purchasers. Texaco would 
likewise be unable to foresee the "ultimate destination" of the 
petroleum. 
Nevertheless, the Bullock Court stated that "[i]t makes 
no difference that the gas eventually moves in interstate 
commerce. For the purposes of [the UDITPA], its status is simply 
determined by whether such property, when sold, is delivered or 
shipped to a purchaser within Texas." Bullock, 614 S.W.2d at 
217. The Texas Court of Appeals noted that "[i]t is [the taxing 
authority's] position that, in spite of the fact that this 
natural gas is eventually delivered by third parties to 
destinations outside of Texas, the sale of the natural gas is 
completed within the state and is therefore taxable. We agree 
with this conclusion." Bullock, 614 S.W.2d at 217. The Bullock 
Court continued by noting that "[t]he statute in question is 
clear and unambiguous and means exactly what it says when it is 
applied to the facts of this case." Id. 
Distinction of the Bullock case attempted by Hercules 
is meaningless. As cases cited by Hercules make clear, the 
inquiry ends when it is determined that the property is delivered 
to the in-state initial purchaser. The Court of Appeals found 
that the completed rocket motors were delivered to Lockheed (an 
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in-state purchaser) and were therefore Utah sales- The Court of 
Appeals did exactly what the UDITPA requires and therefore its 
decision was proper given the clear statutory language of § 59-7-
318. 
Hercules' reliance on the authority it cites to support 
its assertion that the Tax Commission has not accepted the 
destination rule is untenable. Whether or not the destination 
rule (however defined) is an accepted rule of law has never been 
argued or contested by the Tax Commission. Both the Court of 
Appeals and the Tax Commission found that this case is 
distinguished factually, not legally, from the cases cited by 
Hercules in support of its futile "destination rule" argument. 
(R. 627, Opinion at 5.) The distinguishing and controlling fact 
is that the completed rocket motors were sold by Hercules to 
Lockheed in Utah. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 controls 
regardless of the existence of the destination rule and requires 
that the rocket motor sales be apportioned to Utah, not 
Washington or California. (See chart attached as Appendix 2.) 
II. THE TAX COMMISSION'S INCLUDING A UTAH 
SALE IN THE SALES FACTOR NUMERATOR DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
As discussed above, the Court of Appeals properly found 
that no interstate sale occurred and therefore, no Commerce 
Clause double taxation issue is raised. However, even if the 
sale of the rocket motors can somehow be imputed to Washington or 
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California, Utah's inclusion of the rocket motor sales in the 
numerator of the sales factor is constitutional under the tests 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court. 
A. Burden of proof. 
A taxpayer must satisfy a substantial burden of proof 
in order to prevail in a Commerce Ciauso challenge. The United 
States Supreme Ccurt stated that it will only strike the tax if: 
[T]he taxpayer can prove by clear and cogent 
evidence that the income attributed to the 
State is in fact out of all appropriate 
proportions to the business transacted . . . 
in that State or has led to a grossly 
distorted result. 
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 
170 (1983) . 
The Court continued: 
Appellant has the burden of proof; it must 
demonstrate that there is no rational 
relationship between the income attributed to 
the State and the intrastate values of the 
enterprise, by proving that the income 
apportioned to California under the statute 
is out of all proportion to the business 
transacted by the appellant in that state. 
Id. at 180-181 (citations omitted). Hercules has failed to 
satisfy its burden. The sale of rocket motors, as determined by 
the contract between Hercules and Lockheed, and found by the Tax 
Commission and the Court of Appeals, occurred in Bacchus, Utah. 
The income from the sale must be attributed to the sales factor 
in Utah and, therefore, must be allocated to and taxed by the 
State of Utah. Hercules introduced no evidence that refutes the 
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sale in Bacchus, Utah. Essentially, Hercules only argues that 
because it may have paid tax in some other jurisdictionf it need 
not pay tax on sales it makes within Utah which are properly 
includable under the UDITPA. 
The Tax Commission is concerned with the rocket motor 
sales simply for purposes of calculating the Utah sales factor. 
Because the rocket motor sales occurred in Utah, the Auditing 
Division properly imputed those sales as Utah sales for franchise 
tax purposes. Accordingly, Hercules has failed to prove that the 
business transacted between Hercules and Lockheed did not have a 
substantial relationship to the state of Utah for apportionment 
purposes. 
B. The test for unconstitutional double 
taxation. 
Hercules asserts that "'Double Taxation' in this case 
is a stipulated fact, not an unproven hypothetical." Brief of 
Petitioner at 28. Hercules claims that the mere fact that it 
paid some form of tax in California and Washington means Utah 
cannot constitutionally apply unambiguous Utah law to Hercules' 
in-state sales. However, the fact that a taxpayer pays tax in 
two jurisdictions (even if done "involuntarily") does not 
automatically make the tax unconstitutional. 
The test for determining whether a state tax 
apportionment method survives constitutional scrutiny under the 
Commerce Clause is outlined in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
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Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Complete Auto sets forth a four 
pronged test that must be satisfied to sustain an apportioned tax 
on interstate commerce. The four tests are: 
(1) The tax must be applied to an activity 
with a substantial nexus with the taxing 
state; 
(2) The tax must be fairly apportioned; 
(3) The tax must not discriminate against 
interstate commerce; and 
(4) The tax must be fairly related to the 
services provided by the state 
Id. at 279. 
1. Substantial Nexus With Taxing State 
The first prong of Complete Auto is plainly satisfied 
in this case. Hercules is a Utah taxpayer doing business in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. The contract between Hercules and Lockheed 
was for the sale and delivery of rocket motors at Hercules' place 
of business in Bacchus, Utah. The rocket motors were 
manufactured in Utah prior to their sale. Finally, plant 
inspection, acceptance and passage of title to Lockheed all 
occurred in Utah. Each of the facts provides more than 
sufficient nexus with the state of Utah for imposition of 
apportioned franchise tax. 
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2. Internal and External Consistency 
The second requirement set out by Complete Auto is that 
the tax must be fairly apportioned. This requires the tax to be 
both internally and externally consistent. Container Corp., 463 
U.S. 159 at 169. Utah's taxing method (Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-317 
and § 59-7-318) satisfies both these requirements. 
a) Internal Consistency 
To be internally consistent, "a tax must be structured 
so that if every state were to impose an identical tax, no 
multiple taxation would result," Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 
261 (1987). The intention of the UDITPA statute is to assure 
that no multiple taxation results. In fact, the purpose of the 
UDITPA is to organize a strict design whereby each state is only 
entitled to a calculated portion of a corporation's sales. 
Accordingly, the inherent result of employing the statute is 
avoidance of multiple taxation. 
The fact that Hercules paid tax in other jurisdictions 
does not amount to multiple taxation. In Moorman Manufacturing 
Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), an Illinois corporation 
contested Iowa's use of a single factor franchise tax formula to 
apportion an interstate business' income. The taxpayer in 
Moorman argued that both Iowa and Illinois taxed a portion of its 
income derived from business transactions which took place in 
Iowa. Thus, the taxpayer claimed that double taxation resulted 
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because Iowa used a single factor formula while Illinois used the 
more widely accepted three-factor formula. Jd.. at 276. 
The Court stated: 
The simple answer, however, is that whatever 
disparity may have existed is not 
attributable to the Iowa statute. It treats 
both local and foreign concerns with an even 
hand; the alleged disparity can only be the 
consequence of the combined effect of the 
Iowa and Illinois statutes, and Iowa is not 
responsible for the latter. 
Thus, appellant's "discrimination" claim is 
simply a way of describing the potential 
consequences of the use of different formulas 
by the two States. These consequences, 
however, could be avoided by the adoption of 
any uniform rule; the "discrimination" does 
not inhere in either State's formula. 
Id. at 277, n. 12. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the overlap in taxation 
cannot be ascribed to Utah. As previously mentioned, Utah 
adheres to a uniform rule that carves out only that portion of 
tax that the State is entitled to. If the states involved were 
to properly apply the UDITPA, it is plain that Utah is 
statutorily entitled to include the Utah sale of rocket motors 
between Hercules and Lockheed, a Utah purchaser, in the numerator 
of the sales factor. Despite the fact that Hercules paid some 
form of franchise tax to alternate taxing authorities (Washington 
and California), it is critical to note that the state of Utah 
was the authority justified in including the rocket motor sales 
made within the state. Under the facts of this case, Hercules' 
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argument is with California and Washington, not Utah. While 
Hercules may have paid some tax in two separate taxing states, 
such does not represent double taxation in violation of the 
Commerce Clause, but only an error of Hercules in failing to 
recognize its statutory obligation for sales made within the 
state of Utah. 
Hercules argues that "[t]he Tax Commission's reliance 
upon Moorman is misplaced because the facts there were strikingly 
dissimilar to the facts here." Brief of Petitioner at 31. This 
is untrue. In Moorman, the taxpayer was challenging the Iowa 
statute by claiming that both Iowa and Illinois were imposing tax 
on income derived from Iowa sales. Hercules likewise challenges 
Utah's assessment by alleging that payment of Utah, California, 
and Washington taxes would result in double taxation. In 
Moorman, the taxpayer had failed to prove which portion of its 
income had been earned from the Iowa sales, leaving the Court 
unable to determine "whether the Illinois and Iowa together 
imposed tax on more than 100% of the relevant income." Moorman, 
437 U.S. at 276. The record in this case likewise "does not 
establish the essential factual predicate for a claim of 
duplicative taxes" (Id.) since there is not one scintilla of 
evidence showing the amount of tax Hercules paid in either 
Washington or California nor is there any evidence of the amount 
of income Hercules earned in Washington and California. 
Therefore, as in Moorman, Hercules' claim of duplicative taxation 
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is merely speculative and therefore the Commission's inclusion of 
the rocket motor sales in the numerator of the sales factor 
should be upheld. 
b) External Consistency 
To satisfy the external consistency test, the state 
must tax only that portion of the revenues from the interstate 
activity that reasonably reflect the instate component of the 
activity being taxed. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262 (1987). The 
rocket motors at issue are manufactured, delivered, and sold, 
including transfer of title, all within the state of Utah. 
Accordingly, in the present action, the Auditing Division is only 
seeking to include the initial sale of rocket motors as per 
contract between Hercules and Lockheed in Bacchus, Utah. 
Therefore, contrary to Hercules' assertion that Utah and the 
other states are "taxing Hercules like predators fighting over a 
kill" (Brief of Petitioner at 31), Utah is only adhering to the 
clear statutory mandate of the UDITPA. Incidentally, the states 
of Washington and California are also entitled to revenue 
generated from the payroll and property factors of the UDITPA 
formula which reflect Hercules activities in those states. 
However, because the sales of the rocket motors did not occur 
within those states, Utah, not California or Washington, is 
statutorily entitled to include the sales in the sales factor 
numerator franchise tax purposes. 
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3. No Discrimination Against Interstate 
Commerce 
The third prong of Complete Auto provides that the tax 
must not discriminate against interstate commerce. This 
requirement attempts to avoid taxing companies engaged in 
interstate transactions more than firms engaged in in-state 
transactions. Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-317 and § 59-7-318 is 
intentionally designed to assure that Utah does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce. The purpose of the UDITPA is to 
organize a model statute whereby each state is only entitled to 
apportion a calculated share of an corporation's interstate 
sales. Hence, the ultimate result of the statute's application 
is a uniform taxation method and avoidance of impermissible 
discrimination. 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-102(3) (1987) imposes a 
five percent franchise tax on corporations conducting business 
within the state of Utah. This statute explicitly precludes any 
discriminatory effect by taxing all businesses at the same rate 
regardless of whether it is an interstate or intrastate 
corporation. Once the Tax Commission has determined that an 
interstate corporation's sale is "within the state" for taxing 
purposes pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318, that 
corporation's sale is properly included in the numerator of the 
sales factor and taxed at the same rate as any other corporation 
established within the state of Utah. 
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4. Fairly Related to Services Provided by 
the Taxing State 
Finally, Complete Auto requires that the tax be fairly 
related to the services provided by the state. "The fourth prong 
of the Complete Auto test thus focuses on the wide range of 
benefits provided to the taxpayer, not just the precise activity 
connected to the interstate activity at issue." Goldberg v. 
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 267 (1989). The crux of this requirement is 
that multistate corporations must pay their fair share of the 
benefits provided them by the state in which they are located. 
Hercules, as a significant business in the state of Utah, calls 
upon the state of Utah for countless services. To mention a few, 
Hercules is provided with fire and police services at their 
facilities. The state of Utah builds roads allowing access to 
and from Hercules facilities and operations. Utah also affords 
Hercules judicial forums to redress any grievances. While this 
list of services is not exhaustive, the point is that the 
services cannot be provided without fairly apportioning to 
multistate entities their share of the costs. By imposing the 
franchise tax upon Hercules, Utah is able to effectively provide 
a myriad of services to Hercules. As the Court said in Complete 
Auto "[i]t was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve 
those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of 
state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing 
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business." 430 U.S. at 279 (quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau 
of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)). 
Hercules stresses the fact that "California and 
Washington are sovereign states with powers to enforce their tax 
law against taxpayers who may not view taxation to states other 
than Utah as 'voluntary,' as does the Utah State Tax Commission." 
Brief of Petitioner at 32. However, like California and 
Washington, Utah also has the power to enforce its tax law 
against taxpayers who do business and generate income from sales 
made to in-state purchasers. The important point is that Utah 
cannot be bound by the actions of other taxing jurisdictions. 
The Tax Commission must execute and administer the tax laws of 
the State of Utah, not those of California or Washington. This 
Court would be establishing dangerous precedent if it allowed 
other state's actions or the timing of those actions to determine 
the legality or constitutionality of the Tax Commission's 
administration of Utah's tax code. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals was proper in finding several 
of the District Court's factual findings clearly erroneous. The 
Court of Appeals properly found that the sales of the completed 
rocket motors which were the subject of the contract between 
Hercules and Lockheed were complete when Lockheed took delivery 
of the motors at Hercules' Bacchus facility. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 (1987) provides that a sale 
is within this state if "the property is delivered or shipped to 
a purchaser . . . within the state." In the instant action, the 
rocket motors, per the contract between Hercules and Lockheed, 
were delivered to Lockheed at Hercules' place of business in 
Bacchus, Utah. Moreover, Lockheed is a Utah purchaser. Lockheed 
is a Utah taxpayer. It has property, payroll, and sales in the 
state of Utah and accordingly files Utah corporate tax returns. 
Because the sale of rocket motors between Hercules and Lockheed 
occurred in Utah between a Utah seller and a Utah purchaser, the 
Court of Appeals was correct in finding that a Utah sale occurred 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 and is properly includable under 
the UDITPA. 
The Court of Appeals was proper in holding that the 
Auditing Division's tax assessment did not constitute double 
taxation in violation of the Commerce Clause because no 
interstate sale occurred. Under the UDITPA statute, Utah was the 
proper taxing jurisdiction. The actions of Washington and 
California should not be allowed to determine the obligation of 
the Tax Commission to administer the tax laws of the State of 
Utah. The clear mandate of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 requires 
that Utah sales be included in the numerator of the sales factor 
and the fact that Hercules paid some form of franchise tax to 
another jurisdiction does not make Utah guilty of double 
taxation. Further, Utah's UDITPA tax satisfies each of the four 
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tests set out in Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady and should 
therefore be upheld. 
For these reasons, this court should affirm the Court 
of Appeal's r u l i n g . <JJ n -DATED this 
BRIAN L. TARBET 
Assistant Attorney General 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant (Tax Commission) appeals a decision of the Third 
Judicial District Court Tax Division entitling appellee 
(Hercules) to recover the tax in controversy plus interest. We 
reverse. 
FACTS 
During the years 1977 through 1980, the United States 
Government had a contract with Lockheed Missiles & Space Company 
(Lockheed) to build Trident missiles. Lockheed subcontracted 
with Hercules to build the missile motors.1 Hercules 
1. Much confusion exists over the definition of "missile motor." 
Thus, it is important at the outset to distinguish between the 
missile motor, the missile propulsion subsystem, and the 
(continued...) 
manufactured the motors at its Bacchus, Utah facility. Upon 
completion of the manufacturing process, Lockheed, who had a 
business presence in Utah, inspected the motors and received 
title to them at the Bacchus facility. At this point, the 
subcontract items consisted of the unconnected first, second, and 
third stage motors of the missile—three canisters containing an 
explosive propellant in an inert form. The units were then 
shipped from Utah via common carrier, on a government bill of 
lading, to a military assembly facility at a seaport in one of 
several destination states. It was Lockheed's contractual 
obligation at each of these facilities to assemble the components 
of the missile. Hercules, under its subcontract, provided many 
support services at these facilities. Hercules was compensated 
by a cost-plan, fixed fee contract calling for partial payment 
upon delivery to Lockheed at Bacchus, as well as additional 
payment for services performed at the destination facilities. 
Payment was also based on component performance.2 The contract 
provided for incentives rewarding good performance and penalties 
discouraging bad performance.3 
In 1982, the Auditing Division of the Tax Commission issued 
a "Notice of Deficiency" to Hercules claiming additional Utah 
Corporate Franchise taxes were due for the years 1977 through 
1980. On October 4, 1988, the Tax Commission, after a formal 
hearing, affirmed the audit deficiency. On November 2, 1988, 
1. (...continued) 
completed missile. The record and the subcontract show that the 
motor is essentially three large canisters filled with "tooled" 
explosives. The motor is a component of the propulsion 
subsystem. In addition to the motor, the propulsion subsystem 
consists of firing units, actuators, adaptor sections, and 
various other components. The propulsion subsystem, together 
with the re-entry bodies, the nose fairing and the nose cap, make 
up the completed missile. 
2. A missile motor is not like a car motor. The missile motor 
is capable of being fired one time only. Once the motor is 
ignited the "tooled" explosives burn at a steady pace until they 
burn out. The missile cannot be test-fired to check performance. 
Consequently, performance-based payments are not received until 
the missile is actually deployed. 
3. Lockheed had supervisors at the Hercules facility and 
Hercules had supervisors at the destination facility. Each had 
to "sign off" on the work completed by the other. This 
arrangement is necessary considering both stood to benefit 
financially from work done by the other if the missile performed 
successfully. 
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Hercules paid $890,462.00 as a prerequisite to appealing the 
decision to the Third Judicial District Court. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-505 (1987). Of that amount, $456,512.00 was paid 
under protest. On February 1, 1991, the district court reversed 
the Tax Commission's Final Decision and held that Hercules was 
entitled to a refund with interest on the taxes paid under 
protest. The Tax Commission appealed the case to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which transferred the case to us. 
ISSUE 
This appeal involves the application of Utah Code Ann. § 59-
13-93 (1967) to Hercules' sale of missile motors to Lockheed. 
The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), 
governs the amount of taxes payable to Utah when income is 
derived from both within and without the state. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-13-79 (1967) . The business income to be apportioned to this 
state is determined by "multiplying the income by a fraction, the 
numerator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor 
plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-86 (1967). The sales factor is a 
fraction, "the numerator of which is the total sales of the 
taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and the denominator 
of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the 
tax period." Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-92 (1967). Sales of 
tangible personal property are "in this state" if the property is 
"delivered or shipped to a purchaser within this state regardless 
of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-13-93 (1967). The issue in this case is what tangible 
personal property was sold by Hercules to Lockheed. 
ANALYSIS 
The trial court made several findings of fact concerning the 
subject matter of the sale. The trial court found that the 
"property" to be sold by Hercules to Lockheed under the 
subcontract was "a functional rocket motor, which could be fired 
when the manufacturing process was completed." The trial court 
found that upon the completion of manufacturing in Utah, the 
subcontract items "were not a *rocket motor' or functional unit 
that could be fired," and at that point "the total manufacturing 
process of the motors being purchased was approximately 60% 
complete." The trial court further found "the manufacturing 
process was completed at the destination assembly facility." 
We review a trial court's findings of fact under a clearly 
erroneous standard, giving great deference to the trial court's 
findings. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 
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(Utah 1989); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). To successfully attack a 
trial court's findings of factf an appellant must "demonstrate 
that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings." Grayson, 
782 P.2d at 470. 
We find the evidence insufficient to support the trial 
court's findings. The record clearly demonstrates that the 
subject of the Hercules-Lockheed subcontract was a missile motor 
with accompanying services. The motor is not functional when it 
leaves Hercules' Bacchus facility. It is only functional when it 
is assembled into a missile. The court erred when it found the 
subject matter of the Hercules sale to Lockheed was a functional 
or usable motor that could be fired. In essence, the court found 
the subject matter of the sale to be a completed missile. This 
simply is not the case. Lockheed, as the prime contractor, sold 
completed missiles to the government. Hercules, as a 
subcontractor, sold a motor that was a component of the missile's 
propulsion subsystem. 
The trial court found that the motor was not functional when 
it left Hercules' Bacchus facility, that the manufacturing 
process was only 60% complete, and that the manufacturing process 
would not be fully complete until further work was performed at 
the destination facility. It is clear from the record that the 
trial court has confused the missile motor with the missile 
propulsion subsystem.4 The motor was 100% complete in Utah and 
comprised approximately 60% of the propulsion subsystem. The 
director of contract policy implementation for Hercules testified 
at the formal hearing before the Tax Commission that "[w]hen we 
finish a motor, we complete it to a drawing. It's not a usable 
motor at that point, but we complete all the operations that 
Bacchus is responsible for. Then Lockheed will sign off and say, 
*We accept this motor.'" No motor is functional without some way 
to "turn it on." Hercules sold Lockheed a completed missile 
motor. Lockheed combined it with other components necessary to 
"turn it on." The manufacturing of the missile motor was 
completed at Hercules' Bacchus facility. The manufacturing of 
the propulsion subsystem and ultimately the entire missile was 
completed at the destination facility. The tangible personal 
property contracted for by Hercules and Lockheed, and the subject 
matter of the sale generating the business income to be 
4. We reemphasize the difference between the missile motor and 
the missile propulsion subsystem. The propulsion subsystem 
consists of the first, second, and third stage motors, firing 
units, and various other components. Without these additional 
components, the motor is just as unusable as a car motor before 
adding the starter, ignition switch, and other components. 
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apportioned, was the missile motor as it left Hercules' Bacchus 
facility-5 The trial court's findings with respect to the 
property are clearly erroneous. 
Section 59-13-93 of UDITPA states that sales of tangible 
personal property are in this state if "the property is delivered 
or shipped to a purchaser within this state regardless of the 
f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." Utah Code Ann. § 
59-13-93 (1967). Giving no regard to the f.o.b. point or other 
conditions of the sale, the sale in this case is a Utah sale if 
"the property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser within this 
state." 
The trial court applied this statutory language to erroneous 
facts incorrectly concluding the sale at issue in this case was 
not a Utah sale. Applying section 59-13-93 to the motor as it 
left Hercules' Bacchus facility leads to only one reasonable 
conclusion: the sale of the missile motor was a Utah sale. 
Lockheed received the completed missile motors in Utah and is a 
Utah purchaser.6 Under § 59-13-93, Hercules' sale of missile 
5. Hercules bases most of its arguments on the fact that its 
contractual obligations continued after the motor left the 
Bacchus facility. The subcontract between Hercules and Lockheed 
was for the sale of property and services. Hercules' post-sale 
contractual obligations were mainly for services and are listed 
in the subcontract under the heading "Technical Support 
Services." The only issue before us is the apportionment of 
business income generated by the sale of property. The issue of 
income generated by the sale of services is not properly before 
us and we do not decide that issue. 
6. Hercules cites several cases for the proposition that for 
purposes of determining in which state a sale takes place, the 
destination or consumption rule should be applied. See Dep't of 
Revenue v. Parker Banana Co.. 391 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1980) (a purchaser from outside the state does not become a 
purchaser within the state merely by sending a representative to 
pick up the goods); Olympia Brewing Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 326 
N.W.2d 642, 647 (Minn. 1982) (delivery terminates where initial 
purchaser is located); Strickland v. Patcraft Mills, Inc.. 302 
S.E.2d 544, 545 (Ga. 1983) (court applied destination test to 
determine where sale to out-of-state customer took place). Each 
of these cases, however, deals with an out-of-state purchaser 
coming in state to pick up the subject matter of the sale. In 
the case before us, it is undisputed that Lockheed is a 
corporation present and doing business within the state of Utah. 
Lockheed is a Utah purchaser. Accordingly, we do not reach 
(continued...) 
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motors to Lockheed is a sale within this state. The trial 
court's conclusion to the contrary is incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
The Auditing Division of the Tax Commission properly 
assessed additional Utah Corporate Franchise taxes on Hercules 
for the years 1977 through 1980. During that period, Hercules 
sold missile motors to Lockheed. The motors contracted for were 
the motors as they left Hercules' Bacchus, Utah facility. The 
buyer, Lockheed, was doing business in Utah and was a Utah 
purchaser. The sale was hence a Utah sale under Utah Code Ann. § 
59-13-93 (1967), and properly included in the sales factor used 
to apportion business income under Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-92 
(1967). The Tax Commission's apportionment of Hercules' business 
income generated from the sale of the missile motor was proper 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-86 (1967). 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision to the 
contrary. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
6. (...continued) 
appellee's Commerce Clause argument because no interstate sale 
occurred. 
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LOCATION OF 
INITIAL 
PURCHASER 
IN-STATE 
IN-STATE 
OUT-OF-STATE 
OUT-OF-STATE 
OUT-OF-STATE 
OUT-OF-STATE 
OUT-OF-STATE 
OUT-OF-STATE 
MANUFACTURED 
OR PURCHASED 
FOR RETAIL 
SALE? 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
PRODUCT 
ACCEPTED, 
TITLE 
TRANSFERRED, 
POSSESSION 
TRANSFERRED, 
IN ORIGIN 
STATE? 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
INTENDED FOR 
USE AT 
DESTINATION 
STATE? 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
DESTINATION 
APPARENT AT 
TIME OF 
INITIAL 
PURCHASE? 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES J 
